How does the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist fit with existing perioperative risk management strategies? An ethnographic study across surgical specialties by Wæhle, Hilde Valen et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
How does the WHO Surgical Safety
Checklist fit with existing perioperative risk
management strategies? An ethnographic
study across surgical specialties
Hilde Valen Wæhle1,2* , Arvid Steinar Haugen3, Siri Wiig4, Eirik Søfteland3,5, Nick Sevdalis6 and Stig Harthug1,2
Abstract
Background: The World Health Organization (WHO) Surgical Safety Checklist (SSC) has demonstrated beneficial
impacts on a range of patient- and team outcomes, though variation in SSC implementation and staffʼs perception
of it remain challenging. Precisely how frontline personnel integrate the SSC with pre-existing perioperative clinical
risk management remains underexplored – yet likely an impactful factor on how SSC is being used and its potential
to improve clinical safety. This study aimed to explore how members of the multidisciplinary perioperative team
integrate the SSC within their risk management strategies.
Methods: An ethnographic case study including observations (40 h) in operating theatres and in-depth interviews
of 17 perioperative team members was carried out at two hospitals in 2016. Data were analysed using content
analysis.
Results: We identified three themes reflecting the integration of the SSC in daily surgical practice: 1) Perceived
usefullness; implying an intuitive advantage assessment of the SSCʼs practical utility in relation to relevant work; 2)
Modification of implementation; reflecting performance variability of SSC on confirmation of items due to precence
of team members; barriers of performance; and definition of SSC as performance indicator, and 3) Communication
outside of the checklist; including formal- and informal micro-team formations where detailed, specific risk
communication unfolded.
Conclusion: When the SSC is not integrated within existing risk management strategies, but perceived as an “add
on”, its fidelity is compromised, hence limiting its potential clinical effectiveness. Implementation strategies for the
SSC should thus integrate it as a risk-management tool and include it as part of risk-management education and
training. This can improve team learning around risk comunication, foster mutual understanding of safety
perspectives and enhance SSC implementation.
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Background
The World Health Organizationʼs (WHO) Safe Surgical
Checklist (SSC) [1] has been advocated globally, and in
some cases mandated as a surgical safety intervention,
aiming to improve information exchange within the
perioperative team, and to critically review specific safety
items [2]. Clinical effectiveness studies have demon-
strated beneficial impact of the SSC implementation on
a range of patient- and team outcomes, including mor-
tality rates, complication rates, length of in-hospital stay,
teamwork, and adherence to safety processes [3–10].
Also, high-fidelity use of the SSC, i.e. suitable use of all
three parts of it, has been shown of crucial importance
in order to achieve improved outcomes [11]. The evi-
dence thus supports that high quality implementation of
SSC is required for positive effects to be attained [12].
Studies on the implementation of the SSC, however, have
had mixed results [13, 14]. Further, research shows that the
SSC is sometimes used patchily, and that SSC implementa-
tion quality differs among hospitals, surgical specialties, sur-
gical staff members, and among specific items and parts of
the checklists [15–18]. In addition, longitudinal implemen-
tation studies of the SSC have offered only modest, sus-
tained impacts on staff attitude- and satisfaction, and
surgical team perspectives [19–22]. Instead, conflicting
findings and failings to link the SSC to improved outcomes
are causing some at least scepticism around its true poten-
tial as a patient safety intervention [15]. Questions on how
lack of SSC compliance might actually introduce new risks
not present before have also been raised [23], prompting
calls for the reconsideration of policies mandating the SSC
as an organisational safety practice [24].
Although variations in SSC fidelity of use have been
documented, there is limited understanding of why such
variations occur [25–28]. Safety interventions, their im-
plementation and the clinical and organisational context
within which they are applied are intertwined and mutu-
ally interacting, thus influencing how such interventions
actually work in practice (or not) [29]. Structural
changes in operating staff workflow and their percep-
tions of the SSC and patient safety are reccomended to
improve SSC implementation [25].
Ultimately, the reduction of risk SSC aims to achieve
is not achieved by ‘ticking off’ checklist items, but by the
actions and behaviours of the perioperative team the
SSC calls for. [27] A knowledge gap still remains of how
perioperative staff integrate (or not) the SSC into their
pre-existing risk management strategies and tools; and
how their risk perceptions are impacted by the use of
the SSC. Studies that seek to understand the role of
adaptive, human and social practices in safety efforts
such as the SSC are therefore called for [30–32].
Reflecting on the purpose of the SSC, we propose that
for a safety intervention aiming at human behaviour, it is
essential that all team members share an understanding of
clinical risk and risk management strategies; and that the
intervention is actually embedded effectively and effi-
ciently into existing safety practices. Thus, the aim of this
study was to explore how the multidisciplinary periopera-
tive team members integrate the SSC as part of their risk
management strategies in perioperative care.
Methods
Design
This is a prospective ethnographic study. Multidisciplinary
perioperative teams were observed during performance of
the SSC in operating theatres (OTs), followed by face-to-face
interviews of key informants. While focusing on description
and analysis of “everyday” routine practice in their natural
settings, this design is well suited to capture both partici-
pants’ use of SSC and risk communication patterns, as well
as their perceptions of patient safety challenges [32, 33].
Study setting
The study was conducted in two hospitals, a tertiary
teaching hospital and a central community hospital,
within one of the four Regional Health Authorities in the
country. Hospital characteristics are described in Table 1.
The hospitals operate within separate organisational struc-
tures, and perioperative routines vary accordingly. One
surgical unit at each hospital was included in the study.
These hospital units served as surgical study-clusters in a
large stepped wedge, cluster randomised control trial of
the WHO SSC’s impact on patient outcome in 2009–
2010, and were therefore recruited [8]. The adapted na-
tional version of the WHO SSC had been implemented at
both the surgical units, following an educational program
with standardised lectures and dissemination events [22].
Generally there were customisations of the SCC as recom-
mended by the WHO at the two hospitals, with additional
department level customisations in the tertiary teaching
hospital. These customisations were individual and not
coordinated or consistent, but according to local routines
and practice. Following initial introduction, SSC utilisation
was monitored by both the local hospitals and the Re-
gional Health Authority, as part of the national Patient
Safety Programme: In Safe Hands, commissioned by the
Ministry of Health and Care Services [34]. The observed
SSC utilisation indicator was defined as: number of sur-
geries where the SSC was used over total number of per-
formed surgeries [34]. Longitudinal monitoring of SSC
compliance data from 2014 to 2016, showed differences
between the two hospitals (Fig. 1), such that compliance
was lower for hospital 1 compared to hospital 2.
Data collection
Data collection involved non-participant observations and
interviews together with longitudinal SSC compliance rate
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reports derived from administrative data systems (de-
scribed in detail below). Data triangulation was used
across time, hospital settings and professional groups, to
capture a contextualised ‘portrait’ of the SSC within the
studied settings [35, 36].
Perioperative observations
We observed 6 complete surgical cases at each of the study
sites. Observations took about 1 week per site, and covered
specialties of general- and highly specialised surgery. The
observations (40 h) covered scheduled surgical procedures
at dates agreed upon beforehand by the service managers.
All cases were elective, done under general anaesthesia dur-
ing normal working hours, and covered both complex cases
and day-surgeries. Cases where any staff member or the
patient withheld consent were excluded. The observations
aimed to map routine behaviours of “work as done”, ie. ac-
tual SSC team performance, which differs from the concept
“work-as-imagined” (how it should have been done), as the
latter cannot capture context and nuances of clinical work
or how circumstances vary [37].
The checklist was initially introduced to the hospitals in a
randomised controlled trial in 2009–2010, as described by
Haugen et al. [8] The data for this study were collected in
2016 at one hospital at a time, with team observations tak-
ing place prior to interviews, starting at the central commu-
nity hospital (hospital 2 in Table 1). The data collection at
the tertiary teaching hospital was carried out a couple of
months later, as the process of recruiting informants took
slightly longer time. Observations of team interactions and
Table 1 Hospital and interviewee characteristics










































8 4 4 0 3/5 3–30
Total 1310 41,471 – – 17 8 7 2 7/10 3–32
aSize: 2016 Occupancy rate (Statistics Norway) = bed-days/available bed-days. bSurgical hospital stays: 2016 reported stays with one or more surgical procedure,
based on the classification system of the Norwegian diagnosis related groups (N-DRG, Norwegian Patient Registry. cAuthorisation requirements in Norway: 3-year
bachelor degree in Nursing-180 ECTS§ + either a 1,5-year Specialist education program-90 ETCS, or a 2-year Master’s program-120 ECTS at a College University
degree. dAuthorisation requirements in Norway: 6-year cand. Med degree, 360 ECTS + 6,5 years of specialist training before qualification as consultant.
eAuthorisation requirements in Norway: 3-year bachelor degree in Engineering or Nursing180 ECTS + a 2-year Master’s program-120 ECTS at a College University
degree. §European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS) credits
Fig. 1 Longitudinal monitoring of SSC compliance rates in surgical procedures (n = total numbers of procedures/hospital/year) performed
between 2014 and 2016 for study hospital 1. (tertiary teaching hospital) and study hospital 2. (central community hospital)
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communications were noted and reviewed by the research
team. These field notes were used to develop the interview
topic guide and inputs to the data analysis.
Interviews
Interviews were carried out with 17 members of the peri-
operative teams, each typically consisting of one or two
surgeons, at least two operating theatre nurses, one anaes-
thesiologist, one or two nurse anaesthetists, and occaision-
ally one cardiovascular perfusionist. Interview topics
covered SSC use, team-work and communication patterns
(interview guide in Additional file 1). All healthcare
personnel in the perioperative team were considered key
informants. Hence, a maximum variation purposive sam-
pling strategy [38] was used to elicit professional perspec-
tives on SSC utilisation in the OTs. Invitations to
participate were initially reviewed and approved by hospi-
tals managers at the respective study hospitals. Partici-
pants were recruited by the surgical unit managers.
Professionals with variable length of perioperative work
experience were targeted for sampling; their characteris-
tics are described in Table 1. All interviews were con-
ducted in the OT departments, in areas free from
distractions (e.g., meeting rooms). Each participant was
interviewed once. The interviews lasted between 28 and
47min, with median length 36min. The interviews were
audiotaped, and transcribed verbatim for analysis.
All observations and interviews were performed by
HVW (MSc, senior nurse anaesthetist, trained in qualita-
tive research). A second researcher, ASH (PhD, senior
nurse anaesthetist, trained in qualitative research) partic-
ipated in 6 h of the observations to ensure trustworthi-
ness of the findings.
Analysis
Data from observations and interviews were analysed
using an inductive, content analysis approach [39]. The
following steps were used: HVW, ASH, SW (senior
safety scientist, trained in qualitative methods), and SH
(quality manager and senior scientist), read the tran-
scribed interviews forming units of analysis. HVW iden-
tified and coded transcript sections into ‘meaning units’,
followed by relating categories and themes, constituting
the manifest content [39]. Observational data were used
to support the interview data analysis and contributed to
the formation and interpretation of the latent content,
and emerging themes. ASH, SW and SH reviewed the
coding and interpretations. Preliminary themes, sub-
themes and quotes were then discussed amongst all au-
thors, using group consensus to strengthen coherence of
the findings [40]. The finalised dataset is presented in
emerging themes.
Results
Analysis of observations and interviews identified three
major themes: (1) Perceived usefullness, (2) Modification
of implementation, and (3) Communication outside of
the checklist. In the following sections, each of the
themes are presented in detail. The identified themes
and corresponding categories are presented in Table 2,
with representative verbatim quotes and observation
notes (in italics) to illustrate the findings.
Perceived usefullness
Participants expressed various views related to SSC’s prac-
tical utility. The anaesthesia team (nurse anaesthetists and
anaesthesiologists) perceived the SSC to lack practical
value, especially the “Sign-In” part, which was perceived as
not adding anything new to reduce anaesthetic risk. They
reported that they had good control of procedures and
tasks before induction of anaesthesia. Existing checking
mechanisms and protocols were considered sufficient, as
pre-anaesthetic patient risk assessments; e.g. difficult air-
ways, medications, allergies were performed in advance,
and safety tests and -checks of the anaesthesia machine, −
equipment and -medications, were incorporated in existing
routines and reviewed prior to induction of anaesthesia.
Checks performed by the anaesthesia team during the pre-
operative phase were aligned with their roles and responsi-
bilities, acknowledged by both the anaesthesia team and
other perioperative members. In addition, some anaesthe-
siologists expressed a need of retrieving surgical informa-
tion regardless of the SSC, which in their opinion made
reviews of SSC “Sign- In” items superfluous. Yet, some
anaesthesiologists expressed a need for more time to review
and handle high-risk patients together with the nurse
anaesthetists, during a pre-anaesthesia briefing.
Interestingly, however, other staff-members described
situations where they experienced the SSC as being par-
ticularly useful i.e.; by confirmation of patient identity, as
a reminder-list of important safety checks, especially for
procedures that might vary according to types of surgeries,
or patient specific conditions such as administration of
surgical antibiotic prophylaxis. OT nurses described how
surgical equipment reviews during “Time-Out” were ad-
vantageous, as well as tissue-sample labelling double
checks at “Sign-Out”. SSC was also highly valued in order
to provide predictability in the OT, e.g., logistics in OT
scheduling, timing of anaesthesia, and for preparation and
reports to post-anaesthesia ward. Nurses in particular, re-
ported an ease of workflow when everybody in the team
knew the surgical plan. In addition, the “Sign-Out” pro-
vided a sum-up of the surgery, which were reported being
of help to understand exactly what procedures that had
been performed. This was considered helpful in correct
surgical procedure codings. Introduction of the team
members during SSC “Time-Out” was also described by
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Table 2 Themes and categories with illustrative participant quotes and observation notes (in italics)
THEME CATEGORY ILLUSTRATIVE QUOTES FROM PARTICIPANTS (Observation notes in italics)
Perceived usefullness Lack of practical utility Anaesthesiologist: Before I anaesthetise the patient, I know all the parameters for my patients,
I check their circulation, and I know about their vascular occlusions and specific arterial stenosis,
and I feel I have complete control of the patient, so …. It is hard to think that the checklist will
provide extra safety for me.
Anaesthesiologist: Patient safety is part of our training as anaesthesiologists from the very
beginning! Eh- check of the anaesthesia machine, instruments, the patients, and practically
checks of everything we do! Double control of every blood products provided, medications,
everything! In addition to assessing the patient in person and talking to them prior to surgery.
We have always performed these items; it is part of the standardised pre-operative anaesthesia
assessment and preparations.
Nurse anaesthetist: The anaesthesia machine is not due to any variation, it should be checked
prior to every anaesthesia. We do not admit patients into the OT unless the anaesthesia
machine is OK.
Surgeon: Well, the SSC has a function, in a very simplistic way, but it does not have a proper
control function, the way it is supposed to, because we have so many checks and control
mechanisms incorporated. So, I don’t think that the SSC is as important to us, as to other
surgical departments, which have other pre-operative assessment routines. We have so many
points of assessment, where our patients are discussed and evaluated.
Perceived benefits Operating theatre nurse: The SSC is useful as a reminder of double checks of labelling tissue
samples, and to make sure the right surgical equipment is present. Surgical routines are
complicated when you are a beginner …
Nurse anaesthetist: I value how the SSC may contribute in aligning the surgical and
anaesthesia plan for the entire team.






Cardiovascular perfusionist: And occasionally, I may have to call out if there is something I
believe is required or something has been omitted, i.e. that the patient has low haemoglobin
levels, and I need to take action. In addition, during haemodilation, I avoid infusing too much
fluid in the machine. Then I tell the surgeon and anaesthesiologist what I intend to do, to
make them understand what I intend to do.
Operating theatre nurse: Some surgeons that are more reluctant than others, they just start
to mumble through the SSC as soon as they enter the OT, and then proclaim to have
performed time-out. Then, it is required from an OT nurse to be determined and speak up, and
say, «no, this is not good enough! Everybody needs to know what you just said! » Sometimes I
have to add: «No, this was not loud enough, you have to repeat the SSC! » However, to speak
up requires some years of work experience.
Operating theatre nurse: I think the SSC is a good thing, but I miss team concentration
during its performance Things have improved, from the beginning until now, but there is still
too much disturbance during SSC performance. I really miss that everybody stops and pays
attention. Due to the workflow in the OT, there is always someone who pursuits some kind of
work, and does not stop. In addition, you need to pay full attention for the SSC to be
advantageous.
Nurse anaesthetist: But it is obvious, the SSC performance is totally depending on the




Nurse anaesthetist: Personally, I prefer to perform the sign-in with the anaesthesiologist being
present in the OT, I think it is embarrassing to repeat the questions and items I have asked the
patient previously, upon arrival in the OT. So I have almost stopped to ask the patients about
their potential allergies, and so on. The anaesthetist repeats everything when they arrive in OT
anyway.
Observation: The team compositions varied during the different parts of the SSC performance; The
nurse anaesthetist, operating theatre nurse and anaesthesiologist were present during “Sign-In”. The
nurse anaesthetist, operating theatre nurse, surgeon(s) and anaesthesiologist (occasionally) were
present during “Time-Out”. The nurse anaesthetist, operating theatre nurse, surgeon(s) and
anaesthesiologist (occasionally) were present during “Sign-Out”.
Barriers of
performance
Nurse anaesthetist: Well, you don’t want a conflict within the OT, you’re in a way a bit tired of
that, so you try once more to perform the SSC, and if you do not receive any attention, you
just let it go and tick off the box, even though it has not been performed.
Nurse anaesthetist: It is so important to keep the SSC short, because it does in a way disturb
our workflow.. You are about to start induction of anaesthesia, and then; «No, no, we have to
stop and perform the SSC! » Our workflow is interrupted, and it is very disturbing and
frustrating.
Operating theatre nurse: The anaesthesia team is responsible for the anaesthesia, medications
…. It is their responsibility. Questioning them about this is like questioning them whether they
have done their job or not. … .
Wæhle et al. BMC Health Services Research          (2020) 20:111 Page 5 of 11
some surgeons as unifying the team to structure their
focus before incision. This was especially useful for new
and/or unexperienced team-members.
Modification of implementation
Observations identified variations in how different items
and parts of the SSC were carried out – and also in how
the electronic registration of the SSC was done (the lat-
ter is important as it is used to provide national compli-
ance rates). Policy for hospital 1 mandated specific
registration of each of the three parts of the SSC (so 3
separate registrations) whereas policy for hospital 2
mandated one SSC registration including all three parts
(so 1 registration in total).
SSC utilisation varied across different SSC items and
participants’ perception of challenges of actual use. Ob-
servations showed that induction of anaesthesia done in
the OT in both units silenced and concentrated the team
members present in OT. Yet, performance of the SSC
“Sign-In” only few minutes earlier did not have at all the
same effect: it failed to concentrate the teams’ attention.
Participants described how verbal SSC briefings rushed
through the items, forgetting to include the whole team.
Lack of team focus- and concentration during SSC per-
formance was also described. When SSC checks interfered
with existing workflow, the SSC was often partly or poorly
performed, delayed, or left out as a result. Resistance
within the team and verbal disturbances also influenced
performance. As a result, SSC registration was often de-
scribed as a “tick-off exercise”, which some of the partici-
pants vocally worried about its impact on safety.
Presence of the different team members in the OT also
influenced how- and by whom the SSC items were checked.
While nurse anaesthetists and OT nurses were present
during all three parts of SSC, surgeons and cardiovascular
perfusionists were not present in OT during “Sign-In”. Car-
diovascular perfusionists also described being haphazardly
included or not during “Time-Out”, unless they actively ini-
tiated communication themselves about specific items or
equipment in use. Anaesthesiologists described that their
presence in OT during “Time-Out” and “Sign-In” was more
relevant in complex surgical cases, and for high-risk
patients.
Communication outside of the checklist
Risk communication and critical information exchanges
during perioperative care were performed in multiple,
formal and informal micro-team constellations. The
team members’ individual and professional perception of
identified or potential patient safety challenges influ-
enced SSC utilisation, and how, when, and to whom in-
formation on risk was passed in the perioperative phase
of surgery. Their perceptions of safety challenges also in-
fluenced how the team members viewed and exerted in-
fluence on risk communication within the team.
In one of the study sites, according to participants, for-
mal team constellations featured preoperative morning
meetings where the surgical schedule of the day was pre-
sented by the surgeons in charge. Relevant safety issues
were discussed amongst the present team members.
Team members who had been present at the meeting
then disseminated information of importance to their re-
spective colleagues. Some of the interview participants
described this information exchange as a “sub-optimal,
second hand ad-hoc information transfer”. Instead, they
would have preferred that team briefings were better
structured prior to surgery, involving the actual team
members scheduled for that specific surgical procedure.
Table 2 Themes and categories with illustrative participant quotes and observation notes (in italics) (Continued)
THEME CATEGORY ILLUSTRATIVE QUOTES FROM PARTICIPANTS (Observation notes in italics)
Registration practices Observation: At the surgical units in hospital 2, SSC performance was ticked off either after “Sign-
In”, or the “Time-Out” part. There was only one box that needed to be ticked off electronically, in
order for the SSC to be registered as performed. At the surgical unit at hospital 1, all three parts of






Anaesthesiologist: In general, we have contact with the cardiovascular perfusionist prior to
surgery, to inform them about patient specific details such as medications, because they don’t
read the patient records the same way we do.
Operating theatre nurse: …. And if bleeding is involved, we need to notify the anaesthesia





Cardiovascular perfusionist: … and these preparations are being discussed between the
surgeon and the cardiovascular perfusionist prior to surgery.
Operating theatre nurse: In most cases, we have direct communication with the
anaesthesiologist during induction of anaesthesia, and ask permission to start our preparations,
such as positioning the patient, or inserting the urinary tract catheter.
Anaesthesiologist: … and then, the surgeons talk about the details of the surgery they have
performed, while rushing out of the OT, right? And then you have to talk with them afterwards
anyway, due to potential considerations post-operatively, like the follow-up antibiotic prophy-
laxis. Then you have to initiate contact anyway, because certain things require a follow-up.
Wæhle et al. BMC Health Services Research          (2020) 20:111 Page 6 of 11
Aligning the SSC items and reviews according to specific
risks related to the individual patients and their special-
ties was also suggested.
The local SSC version was scaled down to cover a mini-
mum of items. This was explained by physicians in charge
as being sufficient, partly due to factors such as strong or-
ganisational structures, a limited variety of surgical proce-
dures and standardised operative environment with few
OTs. Moreover, the required competencies, professional
experience and good inter-staff relationships were also
cited as elements justifying the reduction of SSC content.
This was emphasised in terms of the highly qualified and
experienced multidisciplinary perioperative team mem-
bers and local practice of one-to-one relationship between
the anaesthesiologist and the patient, throughout the peri-
operative pathway.
The formal planning of surgery and anaesthesia was
performed by the respective surgeons and anaesthesiolo-
gists in charge. If somehow concerns about the patient
needed to be discussed more thoroughly, i.e.; clarifica-
tions about the procedure, required equipment, labora-
tory tests, blood products, or patient medications, the
different health care personnel directly contacted the re-
sponsible professionals. This form of patient specific
communication and information exchange within micro-
team constellations was observed throughout the peri-
operative phase – such that:
– the anaesthesia team reported to have an on-going
dialogue about the patients’ risks, necessary equip-
ment, fluids and medications.
– the OT nurses and surgeons had a continuing
dialogue on maintaining a sterile field, possible risks
and lack of equipment, specimen labelling and
compress counts.
– cardiovascular perfusionists, anaesthesiologists and
nurse anaesthetists had an ongoing dialogue on
collaboration of the haemodynamic controlling.
– the anaesthesiologist had also ongoing dialogue with
the surgeon in charge.
These interactive patterns of micro-team communica-
tion and information exchange clearly dominated and
superseded any SSC checks.
Discussion
This study explored in detail how the perioperative team
integrates use of the SSC as part of their risk manage-
ment strategies in real time during patient care. The in-
dividual and professional “cost-benefit” assessments of
practical usefulness of the SSC influenced which checks
were given attention and by whom. Existing patterns of
micro-team risk communication clearly took precedence
over formal SSC utilisation.
Our findings correspond to the results of a global sur-
vey among medical professionals regarding the SSC [41].
Among the 6269 respondents, impression of usefulness
(67%) was the main factor associated with the SSC usage
[41]. The perceived (un) importance of checklist items
influencing SSC use, was also found in a Canadian study
[42]. How team members perceive SSC sense making in
practice has further been related to the relevance of spe-
cific SSC items, and possibilities of tailoring SSC content
to local context [25, 27, 43, 44].
Anaesthesiologists have previously been identified as being
the least positively disposed towards SSC completions, when
compared with surgeons and nurses [45]. We found that
nurse anaesthetists and anaesthesiologists in particular re-
ported that their existing safety protocols and procedures
such as the pre-anaesthetic patient risk assessment were suf-
ficient. The “Sign-In” review was seen as redundant, coincid-
ing with former arguments of SSC performance being
double checking routines [17, 42]. Still, this perspective
raises the concern of overlooking other team-members’ pos-
sible information needs. It might also indicate that “percep-
tion of risk” is primarily concerned with a narrow view of
active failures associated with one’s own professional role,
rather that wider underlying conditions that impact upon
the entire perioperative team [17]. Whilst the SSC is de-
signed to reduce risk perioperatively, for it to work as a
team-based intervention a shared understanding among all
team members of this simple aim is important. In a previous
study, we have reported that improved patient outcomes
have been associated with improved care processes due to
high quality use of the SSC [11]. This indicates the import-
ance of ensuring that i.e., risk of hypothermia- and responsi-
bilities of corresponding, preventative actions such as
antibiotic prophylaxis is communicated with the team as a
whole. If team members’ perceptions of risk are solely con-
cerned with their professional perceptions of active failures
instead of including underlying conditions, such as risk of
developing surgical site infections, important safety aspects
of the team communication are neglected [17, 46].
In addition to the narrower and wider risk perceptions, we
found that SSC utilisation is also a function of how it is in-
corporated into team membersʼ workflow schedules in OT,
and how much effort has been spent reducing practical bar-
riers within the team [47]. This finding corroborates previ-
ous investigations [18, 25, 42, 44]. However, we identified
that the two study hospitals had different policies for how
the SSC performance was registered and measured. This
may explain some of the observed variation between the two
hospitals. Also, variation in style of checklist implementation
between the hospitals, the presence of local champions, dif-
ferences in safety culture, the support and involvement of
management, might account for the variation [18, 48]. In
terms of these impactful factors, we suggest that SSC per-
formance variations might offer distinct opportunities to
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address risk management at the intersection of perioperative
procedures and actual team working. “Reflective practise” is
a well-known method used to scrutinise oneʼs own taken-
for-grated assumptions and professional work practice, often
accomplished in a collaborative setting [49]. The theory
underlying reflective practice draws on cognitive science and
social psychology, and the central idea is that people make
sense of external stimuli through internal cognitive “frames”.
These invisible frames, in turn, shape the actions people
take. Actions including speech, are observable as are most
results. Figure 2, based on the “Reflective practice” model by
Rudolph and colleagues [49] illustrates how the “invisible”
perceived utility of the SSC influences actions of how the
SSC implementation is modified, and further results in vis-
ible performance variations in an ongoing process. If hospital
managers fail to regard the SSC as a complex, social inter-
vention and instead exert demands for high compliance rates
of SSC performance as a top-down approach, this can lead
to workarounds and outright resistance, and cause for the
checklist to be used as a tick-box exercise to meet manage-
ment requirements [25, 50].
Strengths and limitations
The use of an ethnographic design is well suited to capture
“everyday” routine behaviours in their natural settings [32,
33]. By combining observations and interviews, participants
were given opportunity to identify and share insights into
observed practices of SSC performances that deviated from
the norm. However, this study was limited to explore team
perception of risk management strategies in relation to the
three parts of the SSC, rather than each specific SSC item.
How team members consider use of the SSC to match their
perception of patient safety challenges in perioperative care,
might therefore be limited to reflect local roles and respon-
sibilities of teamwork practice. In order to achieve credible
information, data triangulation was used by collecting data
across time, hospital settings and professions [35]. Although
all members of the multidisciplinary surgical team were
represented by maximum variation purposive sampling
strategy, interview selection bias remains a possibility. As
both observers had anaesthetic background, this may have
introduced biases into the observations.
Although we could not control for any unconscious
such biases during the observation phase, the observa-
tion guide was reviewed and agreed upon with members
of the research team, who had different professional
backgrounds. Following completion of the observations
and interviews, their coding and analysis was further
reviewed and debated within the multiprofessional re-
search team, to ensure balance of professional opinion.
Practical implications and future directions
When well applied, the SSC is an effective intervention. It
has been associated with relative risk reduction of 0.42
(95% confidence interval (CI), 0.33–0.50) of surgical com-
plications, and significant reduction in length of in-hospital
stay in a randomised trial [8]. A recent population cohort
study from Scotland documented a reduction of 36.6%
(95% CI 55.2–17.9) in mortality [51]. Whilst the clinical ef-
fectiveness has been shown, study of implementation strat-
egies to address influential barriers to SSC usage is needed,
coupled with studies of the implementation process and
local contexts [25]. Our findings indicate that how the peri-
operative team members perceived SSC as a risk reducing
intervention, has considerable impact on the execution of
the SSC and risk communication around it. We therefore
propose that the SSC needs to be explicitly integrated into
the risk management toolkit of perioperative care. An inci-
dent analysis from one of the study hospitals recently re-
ported that a patient had wrong surgery despite use of the
SSC. One of the causes contributing to the adverse event
was lack of team response to detected departures from
planned care when the SSC was done [52]. This incident
demonstrates that we need to move beyond use of SSC as a
symbolic safety check; like other safety interventions, the
SSC is vulnerable to meaningless application [23]. When
the SSC is seen as an “add-on”, or more commonly consep-
tualised as an external “thing” [31], the challenge of its inte-
gration into perioperative work remains.
How does the SSC become better integrated as a peri-
operative safety strategy? We propose that the SSC needs
Fig. 2 Revised model of “Reflected practice” based on: Rudolph J, et al. Simul Healthcare 2006;1: 49–55. “Frames”, “Actions” and “Results” are
illustrated with examples* derived from results of the content analysis
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to be formally established as one (and only one) element of
our toolkit of standardised perioperative safety mechanisms.
This will contribute to the development of a shared mental
model within perioperative teams [53], such that the SSC
becomes owned by them and applied in conjunction (and
not in addition to) all other safety mechanisms in the OT,
and indeed also pre- and post-operatively. This proposal
follows on from recent policy developments in periopera-
tive safety. For example, the national standard for the safe
practice of anaesthesia, and the Helsinki declaration on pa-
tient safety in anaesthesiology [54] have established norma-
tive guidelines for everyone who provides anaesthesia care
[55]. The observed behaviours related to induction of an-
aesthesia, reflect a sense of situation awareness amongst the
team members, which might stem from a common under-
standing of this safety standard. In the UK, the National
Safety Standards for Invasive procedures have been devel-
oped to set out the key steps necessary to deliver safe and
common care standard for surgery, including the SSC but
also many other checks and tools [56]. We believe that such
a normative standardisation would contribute to establish-
ing a shared mental model for the SSC globally. Of course
further implementation strategies are required to translate
standards into practice – including educational interven-
tions, regular dissemination and updating of the standards
based on emerging evidence [57].
Conclusion
This study showed that when the SSC is perceived as an
“add on” and not integrated as a risk management tool
or part of the multidisciplinary risk management strat-
egy, its fidelity is low. Strategies to enhance patient
safety in surgery should focus on a multidisciplinary ap-
proach to foster shared mental models of safety stan-
dards in the OT. Aligning risk-assessment in SSC staff
education where the SSC is part of a safe surgical risk
assessment system, might provide an improved sense of
value to all OT personnel, improve team learning of risk
communication, and foster mutual understanding of
safety perspectives.
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